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HUSTLER V. FALWELL: WORST CASE IN




There you are, in your faculty office, sipping morning coffee and checking
your email. A student with a pained expression sheepishly knocks on your
door, half ajar. She says, “Professor, there’s something that you should see, if
you haven’t already.” She hands you a copy of Hustler magazine, a magazine
so smutty that purveyors of Playboy and Penthouse would have primly, and at
least publicly, abjured subscribing to it.1 “Look at page twenty-eight,” your
student dolefully instructs you. You thumb through the magazine’s pages of
flesh and filth, and on page twenty-eight, you see an ad parody featuring you—
or, rather, a fictitious “you” that has been brazenly concocted by Hustler’s
editors—casually recounting with bemused satisfaction your first time having
sex. In the parody, this “you” tells the interviewer that your first time took
place in an outhouse . . . while you were drunk . . . with your mother.2
Two minutes after reading the Hustler parody, you are mortified to realize
the inevitable: that numerous people at the law school—your colleagues, the
dean, and, worst of all, the students—have seen this parody. You soon discover
that the parody has now been posted online in gossipy blogs. Your friends at
other law schools have emailed you, shocked and empathetic. You hear snick-
ering by students as you walk past them in the courtyard. And, after a day
consumed by silent angst and apprehension, your mother calls you, her voice
choked by sobs of torment.
Should Hustler be entitled to publish such a parody about you? If you’re a
public figure—if you are “intimately involved in the resolution of important
public questions or, by reason of [your] fame, shape events in areas of concern
to society at large”3—then according to the Supreme Court in Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell, yes.4 Considering the emotional devastation that such a deci-
sion can unleash, the Court, one would expect, should have varnished its
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. B.A., U.C. Berkeley; J.D.,
UCLA; Ph.D., University of Michigan. Thanks to Jeff Stempel for inviting me to the Nevada
Law Journal’s symposium on the “Worst Supreme Court Case Ever.”
1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL
38 (1988) (describing Hustler as incomparably more offensive than Playboy and
Penthouse).
2 The facts are derived from Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
3 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring), quoted in
Hustler, 485 U.S. at 51.
4 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 51.
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decision with a splendid justification. But it didn’t; not by a long shot. And
while Hustler Magazine v. Falwell probably will not show up on anyone’s
radar for the Worst Supreme Court Case Ever, there are a couple of reasons for
treating it as such.
One, in a startling act of moral indifference, the Hustler Court made pub-
lic figures appallingly vulnerable to emotional injury, thereby violating basic
expectations for moral decency.
Two, the Hustler opinion is, unlike many atrocious court opinions, still
good law, and unlike, say, Bush v. Gore, there is no discernible segment of the
population that has prudently dismissed the opinion as a sham.
And, three, dreadful though it is to acknowledge, my students have lauded,
year after year, the Hustler opinion as eminently sensible and a logical victory
for the Enlightenment. Perhaps needlessly sensitive to charges of didacticism, I
have been reluctant to disturb my students’ rosy assumptions, but, running low
on the resources of patience, and growing crankier with age, I am now eager to
reform those assumptions. (I hasten to add, however, that none of what I say is
meant to disparage the decision in Hustler, only its opinion, a distinction whose
explanation would warrant, alas, another essay.)5
For now, let us begin with what the Hustler opinion made susceptible to
assault: civility, along with its correlate, dignity.
I. CIVILITY AND DIGNITY MATTER
Notwithstanding its conventional affiliation with politeness, civility is
more than good manners.6 Civility is indispensable as the social glue that holds
a community together by preempting conflict.7 For civility is “the sum of the
many sacrifices we are called to make for the sake of living together.”8 Civility,
so conceived, is the means by which we obtain societal peace.9 Note here the
etymological intimations of civility’s function as a social adhesive; we find the
word civility in civilization and civil society.10
5 I have offered an alternative and, to my mind, better, justification for the Court’s decision
in Hustler. See John M. Kang, In Praise of Hostility: Antiauthoritarianism as Free Speech
Principle, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351 (2012) (arguing that an adjudicative principle of
antiauthoritarianism should underwrite highly offensive speech against public figures and
public officials) [hereinafter Kang, Hostility].
6 As the philosopher Thomas Hobbes morosely observed long ago, without civility the life
of man is “poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (Edwin Curley
ed., Hackett 1994) (1651). See John M. Kang, The Uses of Insincerity: Thomas Hobbes’s
Theory of Law and Society, 15 L. & LITERATURE 371, 378–81 (2003) (arguing that civility is
the basis for civil society) [hereinafter Kang, Insincerity]; John M. Kang, Manliness and the
Constitution, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 261, 293–97 (2009) (making an analogous
argument) [hereinafter Kang, Manliness].
7 Kang, Manliness, supra note 6, at 293–94; Kang, Insincerity, supra note 6, at 378–81.
8 STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY
11 (1998).
9 Kang, Insincerity, supra note 6, at 378–81.
10 For further etymological connections deriving from “civility,” see Kang, Manliness,
supra note 6, at 293–94.
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Also, civility is more than necessary for society. It is crucial for the well-
being of the individual.11 For civility is indispensable to protect the individual’s
sense of dignity.12 An individual derives his sense of self-worth in large part
from how others treat him, an axiom that has found support from sociologists.13
So too, it is an article of faith that has been eagerly adopted by institutions
seeking to denigrate the individual’s sense of self-worth for the purpose of con-
trolling that individual.14 The great sociologist Erving Goffman has found such
examples of systematic degradation, what might otherwise constitute the tort of
emotional distress, in “total institutions,” institutions dedicated to the complete
regulation of the individual, such as prisons, concentration camps, and mental
hospitals.15
Given the centrality of civility to the individual’s well-being, it is unsur-
prising that the common law of libel, which currently finds expression in differ-
ent state jurisdictions, seeks to protect “the standing of the person in the eyes of
others.”16 To wit, the common law does not pad the right of the speaker by
burdening the victim with the task of proving that the speaker had delivered a
misstatement of fact about the victim; under the common law, hurtful opinions
about the victim are also actionable.17 This latter view is explained in part by
Justice Stewart’s observation about what is at stake morally in libel law: “The
right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion
and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dig-
nity and worth of every human being.”18 Note how the “wrongful hurt” refer-
11 ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
128–29 (1995).
12 Id.; see also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 196–97 (1986).
13 POST, supra note 11, at 128–29. The University of Chicago sociologist George Herbert
Mead examined how a person derives his sense of individual identity by belonging to some
group and by adopting the group’s view of himself. See GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF &
SOCIETY 135–226 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1970). Mead concluded: “What goes to make up
the organized self is the organization of the attitudes which are common to the group. A
person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institu-
tions of that community into his own conduct.” Id. at 162. Therefore, one may infer that if a
community constantly violates the norms of civility toward a particular individual and
abuses him, that individual will experience difficulty in developing a stable sense of self.
14 POST, supra note 11, at 128.
15 ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS
AND OTHER INMATES 12–92 (1961). Goffman observed:
The recruit comes into the [total institution] with a conception of himself made possible by
certain stable social arrangements in his home world. Upon entrance, he is immediately stripped
of the support provided by these arrangements. In the accurate language of some of our oldest
total institutions, he begins a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations
of self. His self is systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified.
Id. at 14.
16 POST, supra note 11, at 128. The following cases define libel as the “malicious defama-
tion of a person” that exposes him to “public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him
of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse”: Ragland v. Household Fin.
Corp., 119 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Iowa 1963) (quoting an Iowa law defining libel); State v.
Haider, 150 N.W.2d 71, 73–74 (N.D. 1967) (quoting a North Dakota law defining libel);
Johnson City v. Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 477 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tenn. 1972) (quoting a
Tennessee law defining libel).
17 See supra note 16.
18 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (emphasis added).
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enced by Justice Stewart can be caused by those statements which are rooted in
opinion, not simply fact, and that, so too, the “dignity” and the “worth” of a
human being can be just as easily demolished by opinion.
Be that as it may, contrary to Justice Stewart’s declaration, not “every
human being,” is entitled to the same degree of protection against offensive
speech, or so the Supreme Court has ruled.19 In the next section, I discuss how
the Court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell made clear that “public figures” do
not enjoy the protection afforded ordinary citizens.20 I will explain in the next
section why the Court’s reasons for this decision are manifestly unconvincing.
II. THE CASE BACKGROUND AND COURT OPINION
The story of Falwell v. Hustler Magazine begins with two men who were,
on some level, utter opposites. On-air host of the “Old Time Gospel Hour,” the
Reverend Jerry Falwell was a conservative and unusually influential Baptist
preacher who publicly condemned pornography.21 Larry Flynt was the eccen-
tric and foul-mouthed publisher of the scandalously X-rated Hustler.
For years, Flynt raged against Falwell and other leaders of what the former
derided as “organized religion.”22 Flynt resented their moral denunciations of
pornography and angrily mocked them as blowhard hypocrites.23 In November
1983 Flynt raised his loathing to new heights by publishing a now infamous
parody of Falwell.24 The parody was meant to spoof the Campari Liqueur ads
popular in the 1980s in which a contrived interviewer asked a celebrity about
her “first time,” with the latter phrase playing with the double-entendre of the
celebrity’s first time sipping Campari and her first time trying sex.25 Hustler’s
ad parody depicts Falwell casually narrating his first time having sex with his
mother.26 The cruel ribaldry unleashed by Hustler against Falwell can be best
conveyed by reproducing the parody in its entirety:27
Falwell: My first time was in an outhouse outside Lynchburg, Virginia.
Interviewer: Wasn’t it a little cramped?
Falwell: Not after I kicked the goat out.
Interviewer: I see. You must tell me all about it.
Falwell: I never really expected to make it with Mom, but then after she showed all
the other guys in town such a good time, I figured, “What the hell!”
Interviewer: But your mom? Isn’t that a bit odd?
Falwell: I don’t think so. Looks don’t mean that much to me in a woman.
Interviewer: Go on.
Falwell: Well, we were drunk off our God-fearing asses on Campari, ginger ale and
soda—that’s called a Fire and Brimstone—at the time. And Mom looked better than
a Baptist whore with a $100 donation.
19 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)).
20 Id. (quoting Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 164).
21 SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 8–9, 108.
22 See id. at 56.
23 Id. at 23, 153.
24 Id. at 22.
25 Id. at 21.
26 Id. at app. I.
27 Id.
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Interviewer: Campari in the crapper with Mom . . . how interesting. Well, how was
it?
Falwell: The Campari was great, but Mom passed out before I could come.
Interviewer: Did you ever try it again?
Falwell: Sure . . . lots of times. But not in the outhouse. Between Mom and the shit,
the flies were too much to bear.
Interviewer: We meant the Campari.
Falwell: Oh, yeah, I always get sloshed before I go out to the pulpit. You don’t think
I could lay down all that bullshit sober, do you?28
Accompanying the parody was an unexpectedly guarded disclaimer writ-
ten in tiny but readable letters at the bottom: “AD PARODY—NOT TO BE
TAKEN SERIOUSLY.”29 Hustler’s table of contents also echoed that the
depiction of Falwell was “Fiction” and “Ad & Personality Parody.”30 These
lawyerly addendums were unable to salve the wounded Reverend Falwell,31
whose staffer had forwarded to him a copy of the salacious magazine. “I some-
how felt that in all of my life I had never believed that human beings could do
something like this,”32 he rued. “I really felt like weeping.”33 He felt like doing
something more than weeping: Falwell sued Flynt and his magazine for $45
million.34
Falwell presented three causes of action against Flynt: one for invasion of
privacy, the second for libel, and the third for emotional distress.35 Falwell lost
on the first two claims.36 On the claim for invasion of privacy, Falwell lost
because he failed to show, in accordance with Virginia state law, that Flynt had
appropriated Falwell’s name or likeness for “advertising.”37 After all, Hustler’s
parody was not an advertisement, just a spoof of one.38 So, too, Falwell was
unable to persuade the jury that he was a victim of libel because a libel claim in
Virginia required the plaintiff to show that the defendant had made an inaccu-
rate factual representation regarding the plaintiff.39 But Hustler had never made
any representations of fact; it offered only parody.40 The jury thus dismissed
the libel claim.41 However, Falwell won $150,000 on the claim for emotional
distress, a verdict upheld by the federal appellate court.42 Flynt appealed the
verdict on the claim of emotional distress, and the U.S. Supreme Court eventu-
28 Id. (emphasis omitted).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 2–3.




35 Falwell v. Flynt, No. 83-0155-L-R, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20586, at *1 (W.D. Va. Apr.
19, 1985), aff’d, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
36 Id. at *1–2.
37 Id. at *1 n.1.
38 Id. at *1; see also SMOLLA, supra note 1, at app. I.
39 Falwell, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20586, at *2.
40 Id. at *1.
41 Id.
42 Falwell, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20586, at *2; Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th
Cir. 1986).
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ally decided in his favor.43 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
didn’t deny that the parody was reprehensible yet insisted that it deserved First
Amendment protection.44
For support, Justice Rehnquist argued that offensive, even abhorrent,
speech was entitled to protection under certain circumstances so that the audi-
ence would be more likely to discover some truth: “At the heart of the First
Amendment,” he declared, “is the recognition of the fundamental importance of
the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”45
The essence of Justice Rehnquist’s position rested on the justification—what I
will call the justification from truth—that the First Amendment should enable
the audience to deliberate a diversity of views in order to arrive at better ideas
of the truth.46 Put aside for now whether this justification from truth is plausi-
ble in the abstract; none of the precedents which Justice Rehnquist marshals,
precedents embodying the justification from truth, bear any resemblance to the
facts of Hustler. What he offers instead is a paradigmatic example of that
which we implore our students to eschew—flabby legal reasoning.
III. THE LEGAL PRECEDENTS ARE INAPPOSITE
Justice Rehnquist argues that a string of Supreme Court cases has used the
justification from truth to underwrite speech and that the facts in Hustler are
similar to the facts in those cases; according to Justice Rehnquist, then, Hus-
tler’s parody should also be upheld by the justification from truth. “‘The free-
dom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a
good unto itself,’” Justice Rehnquist recited, “‘but also is essential to the com-
mon quest for truth.’”47 As the internal quotation marks indicate, these words
are taken from another source, in this instance, Justice Rehnquist’s own words
from his dissenting opinion in an earlier case, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of United States.48 And by so quoting himself, Justice Rehnquist reassuringly
implies that the logic in the earlier case can be confidently transposed to the
circumstances of Falwell v. Hustler Magazine.
But the facts in the two cases are quite different. In Bose Corp., Consumer
Reports magazine had published an unflattering review of the Bose 901 audio
speakers.49 The review, according to the Court, “describ[ed] the system and
some of its virtues” but noted that the
individual instruments heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic
proportions and tended to wander about the room. For instance, a violin appeared to
be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched from wall to wall. With orchestral music, such
effects seemed inconsequential. But we think they might become annoying when
listening to soloists.50
43 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988).
44 Id. at 50.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 50–51.
47 Id. at 51 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04
(1984)).
48 Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 503–04.
49 Id. at 487–88.
50 Id. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Consumer Reports then followed with a warning:
We think the Bose system is so unusual that a prospective buyer must listen to it and
judge it for himself. We would suggest delaying so big an investment until you were
sure the system would please you after the novelty value had worn off.51
One can quibble that these and other statements by Consumer Reports
amounted to libel, as Bose did in vain before the Supreme Court,52 but one
cannot deny that the published assessments by Consumer Reports, a periodical
formally dedicated to informing the public, were attempts to help the audience
discern the truth about a given product’s value.53
Hustler’s parody, by contrast, was—by its own admission—an “AD PAR-
ODY—NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY,” and a “Fiction.”54 What made
the parody so mischievous and, to the readers of Hustler, presumably droll, was
not that it contained a modicum of truth or potential truth but that it was an
unbounded exercise in raw juvenilia whose narrative plausibility could only be
savored in the realm of fantasy. Unlike Consumer Reports, Larry Flynt’s por-
nographic magazine never sought to educate the public or to help it to discern
the truth. In this light, read again Justice Rehnquist’s appropriation in Hustler
of his own words from Bose Corp.: “The freedom to speak one’s mind is not
only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is
essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”55
How can Hustler’s parody be “essential to the common quest for truth”? More
precisely, what “truth” is being earnestly urged by the parody? The parody
itself claims that it is “NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.”56
Justice Rehnquist, however, proceeded to insist that Hustler’s parody was
an heir—a distant and rather shabby heir, he admitted, yet one nonetheless—to
a long line of parodies without which “our political discourse would have been
considerably poorer.”57 He elaborated:
Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying George
Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions and satirical
cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate. Nast’s castiga-
tion of the Tweed Ring, Walt McDougall’s characterization of Presidential candidate
James G. Blaine’s banquet with the millionaires at Delmonico’s as ‘The Royal Feast
of Belshazzar,’ and numerous other efforts have undoubtedly had an effect on the
course and outcome of contemporaneous debate.58
Read again the last sentence: “[Political parodies] have undoubtedly had
an effect on the course and outcome of contemporaneous debate.”59 Even if
this were true, Justice Rehnquist’s examples from history fail to resonate with
the facts of Falwell. For Justice Rehnquist’s examples from history are preg-
51 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
52 Id. at 514.
53 See id. at 494–95 (discussing Consumer Reports employment of a sound engineer to
examine the Bose sound system and to publish his findings).
54 SMOLLA, supra note 1, at app. I; see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48
(1988).
55 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 51 (quoting Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 503–04).
56 SMOLLA, supra note 1, at app. I; see also Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.
57 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55.
58 Id. at 54–55.
59 Id. at 55.
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nant with political or social criticism whereas Hustler’s parody is rife with
nonsense. The cartoons of Nast and McDougall bristle with the message of
moral indictment and the call for reform.60 Even the cartoon portraying Wash-
ington as an ass61 is meant to criticize the first president’s mistakes and thus to
cast as undeserving his vaunted authority. Justice Rehnquist is, then, correct to
say that absent such biting commentary “our political discourse would have
been considerably poorer.”62 The Hustler parody is in a different league, how-
ever. While its subjects are Falwell and his mother, the parody cannot be read
as criticizing Falwell for having sex with his mother. Hustler’s parody, indeed,
disclaims any interest in participating in the sort of “political discourse” refer-
enced by Justice Rehnquist in support of Hustler’s parody; the parody, in Hus-
tler’s own words, was “NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.”63
Justice Rehnquist worries that “[w]ere we to hold [in favor of Falwell],
there can be little doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would be sub-
jected to damages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed
its subject.”64 Webster’s Dictionary, Justice Rehnquist continued, “defines a
caricature as ‘the deliberately distorted picturing or imitating of a person, liter-
ary style, etc. by exaggerating features or mannerisms for satirical effect.’”65
So the operative definition of caricature for Justice Rehnquist is exaggeration.
And, faithful to his definition, all of Justice Rehnquist’s recited examples from
history in his Hustler opinion indeed harp on the theme of exaggeration: the
cartoon of Washington is meant to exaggerate his purported obtuseness in the
eyes of his detractors; Nast’s cartoon of the Tweed Ring is meant to exaggerate
the Ring’s vast and corrupt power; McDougall’s cartoon is meant to exagger-
ate how Blaine has been bought off by moneyed interests. Heck, for that mat-
ter, consider the zany hyperbole of my Essay’s title—“Worst Supreme Court
Case in the History of the World, Maybe the Universe”; the exaggeration is
meant to highlight the flaws in Justice Rehnquist’s opinion. Hustler’s parody,
by contrast, does not exaggerate anything; it is utter fabrication.
The justification from truth, at least as Justice Rehnquist employs it, thus
would seem unable to underwrite First Amendment protection for Hustler’s
parody.
60 See 7 JAMES FORD RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE COMPROMISE OF
1850 TO THE MCKINLEY-BRYAN CAMPAIGN OF 1896, at 25 (1914) (describing the biting and
relevant political criticisms by Nast against the corruption of Tweed and his cohorts); ROB-
ERT L. GAMBONE, LIFE ON THE PRESS: THE POPULAR ART AND ILLUSTRATIONS OF GEORGE
BENJAMIN LUKS 32 (2009) (describing the McDougall’s cartoon as an indictment of political
corruption by the rich).
61 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 54.
62 Id. at 55.
63 SMOLLA, supra note 1, at app. I (emphasis added); see also Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57
(reaffirming the finding that the parody lacked factual representation).
64 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 53.
65 Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW UNABRIDGED TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 275 (2d ed. 1979)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
To deem any single Supreme Court case the worst ever is to court baffled
groans and testy rebuke; any endeavor to do so makes one’s essay instantly
eligible as a candidate for a future symposium on the Worst Essay Ever. Why
that case, the reader might sigh, and not another from an almost obscenely
plentiful cast of evil/stupid/tragic Supreme Court opinions? While I cannot
quell the reader’s likely frustrations over my choice, I have tried to justify it. I
have chosen Hustler Magazine v. Falwell because I believe that human beings
deserve to be treated with dignity and that deviations from this moral position
demand an exceptional explanation. Years since first reading the Court’s Hus-
tler opinion, I, for one, am still waiting for a good justification for such
deviation.66
66 Unbidden, I have tried to craft a more serviceable justification for the Court’s decision in
Hustler. See Kang, Hostility, supra note 5.
